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Abstract 
Although it has many merits, the voluminous literature on urban governance gives scant 
attention to the actual involvement and positioning of business elites and businesses within 
Public–Private Partnerships. There is also little consensus among academics as to why the 
private sector become involved in such schemes. This paper begins to address these issues 
through a critical empirical examination of how and why the private sector is involved with 
three English Town Centre Management (TCM) partnerships and the Business 
Improvement District (BID) subsidiaries all three partnerships have recently developed. In 
order to do this, the empirical study is guided by a conceptual framework that foregrounds 
the relationship between (a) the opening up and monitoring of ‘institutional space’ by 
partnerships and the state, and (b) the motivations and ‘constrained agency’ of the business 
elites. The paper demonstrates that the positioning of the private sector is more multifarious 
and fractured than previous studies of urban governance have suggested. It also reveals that 
business elites and businesses view their participation as an ‘investment’ that needs to accrue 
significant financial returns and that partnership and state officials are highly selective in 
their choice of ‘who governs’. 
Keywords: Urban governance; Business elites; Political mobilization; Business Improvement 
Districts; Town Centre Management; England 
 
1. Introduction 
Geographers and academics in cognate disciplines have spent considerable time outlining the 
emergence of Public–Private Partnerships (PPPs) and the inclusion of business elites within 
contemporary urban governance (e.g. Imrie and Raco, 1999; Ward, 2000; Geddes, 2006). 
They have also paid close attention to the problematic rolling out of speculative, 
entrepreneurial projects from place marketing to urban regeneration and their governance by 
the ‘new urban governors’ (e.g. Harvey, 1989; Raco, 2003a; Kavaratzis, 2007). These studies 
provide extremely useful accounts of the reconfiguration of urban politics and the nature of 
contemporary urbanism. Yet they tend to fall short on two fronts. First, they are often 
unclear how business elites and businesses are positioned within urban governance and, 
second, there is little consensus as to why business elites and businesses get involved. 
Through an empirical examination of three English Town Centre Management (TCM) PPPs 
and the Business Improvement District (BID) subsidiaries all three TCM partnerships have 
developed, this paper offers a tentative insight into the positioning and motivations of the 
private sector in contemporary urban governance. This paper begins by critically reviewing 
the existing literature on the subject and developing a conceptual framework for 
understanding business involvement in urban governance. Using this framework, it then 
examines the positioning and motivation of businesses and business elites within TCM 
partnerships and their BID subsidiaries in Coventry, Plymouth and Reading. An empirical 
analysis of these case studies is useful in three respects. First, it vividly demonstrates the 
diverse inner-workings of two of the most-used and powerful PPP formations in England 
and the positioning of the private sector within these. Second, the comparative dimension of 
this study enables us to see the geographically hybrid nature of BIDs and TCM schemes, 
simultaneously stressing the commonalities and differences between these ‘actually-existing’ 
partnerships (Nijman, 2007; Ward, 2008). Third, these empirical insights can, and will, 
inform the conceptual points made by this paper. 
Methodologically, this paper draws from semi-structured elite interviews conducted between 
January 2006 and January 2007. Interviews were conducted with four groups of actors, 
namely those involved in the national governance of TCM and BIDs; partnership staff and 
members of the three local partnerships; representatives of other institutions that worked 
closely with the partnerships; and a small number of business elites who had limited or 
fractured engagement with the local partnerships. In total, 49 interviews were conducted, 
each of whom were recorded, transcribed and encoded using the software package NVivo7. 
The case studies of CV One in Coventry, the Plymouth City Centre Company (hereafter 
Plymouth CCC) and Reading UK Community Interest Company (hereafter Reading UK 
CIC) were selected because of their differentiated TCM and BID organisational structures 
(as will be detailed later). 
 
2. Reconstituting the local state 
The local state has been heavily influenced and intertwined with the private sector. Focusing 
on England in particular, many of the practices and agendas of the local state have become 
more private sector-like. The local state, in the words of Phil Hubbard and Tim Hall, is 
‘‘being run in a more businesslike manner” (Hubbard and Hall, 1998, p. 2), adopting 
‘‘characteristics once distinctive to business – risk-taking, inventiveness, promotion and 
profit motivation” (Hall and Hubbard, 1996, p. 153). Their characterisation echoes the 
literature on the New Public Management (NPM) which identifies an increased emphasis by 
the state on competitiveness, accountability, efficiency, ‘hands-on’ auditing and 
benchmarking (the measuring and comparing of performance) and a move towards flatter 
hierarchies (e.g. Dunleavey and Hood, 1994; Dibben and Higgins, 2004). However, the 
emulation of private sector practices and mentalities, as Ward (2007a, pp. 7–8) notes, is an 
uneven and often unstructured process, varying between policy fields, organisations and 
places. 
In addition, the local state has opened its doors to non-state actors and PPPs in the 
governance and delivery of ‘public’ services. For Jessop (1997, p. 37), a de-statisation of the 
state is taking place. For others, a shift from government to governance is underway (e.g. 
Ward, 2000; Kjær, 2009). Nonetheless, we should be careful not to see this as a clear-cut 
binary shift from one epoch to another. As Imrie and Raco (1999, 2001) insist, this transition 
is uneven spatially and temporally with non-elected elites and entrepreneurial tactics having 
longer (if somewhat hidden) histories in local government than first suspected (cf. Ward, 
2000, 2001). 
Under New Labour, there has been a partial and uneven emphasis on involving residents, 
the voluntary sector and ‘communities’ in urban governance (Raco and Flint, 2001; 
Atkinson, 2003; Geddes, 2006). However, it is the private sector and its business elites that 
have been the most actively welcomed ‘outsiders’ to the new governance structures. 
Research has revealed five frequently-used strategies in which local government and its 
partners have sought to involve the private sector, namely: the contracting out of selected 
local state services (Szymanski and Wilkins, 1993; Grimshaw et al., 2002; Reimer, 2003; 
Higgins et al., 2005); the privatising of selected local state services and assets (Ginsburg, 
2005); private financing for public and public–private services and buildings (Medway et al., 
1999, 2000; Flinders, 2005, 2006); the use of private auditors, financial advisors and 
consultants (e.g. Saint-Martin, 1998; Shaoul et al., 2007); and the development of PPPs (Peck 
and Tickell, 1995; Flinders, 2005; Geddes, 2006). For Flinders (2006, p. 225) the 
restructuring of who governs, delivers and finances public services has led to a blurring of 
the lines demarcating the public and private sectors with a substantial ‘grey zone’ emerging 
‘‘where the public–private distinction becomes opaque and the established frameworks for 
ensuring legitimacy, accountability and control become less clear”. 
Beyond these observations, the urban governance literature is somewhat unclear about the 
positioning of private sector elites and institutions within these new structures. Wood (2004), 
for instance, argues that it is hard to decipher from the literature what private sector elites 
actually do when they sit on PPP boards or how they influence the partnerships’ agendas. 
That said, a number of studies within the management studies tradition have provided partial 
insights into the internal operations of voluntary and nonprofit boards (e.g. Harris, 1996; 
Mole, 2003; Rochester, 2003). They have usefully examined, among other things, the tension 
and collaborations within the boardroom; the shifting division of labour between board 
members, chief executives and staff; and the ways in which decisions are made. However, 
while this literature is empirically rich, it rarely focuses on the external, multi-scalar pressures 
and influences facing the boards (Cornforth, 2003) or how these boards actively shape the 
wider processes of neoliberalisation (Wood, 2004). 
Although it casts little light on the political roles and powers of the private sector, the urban 
governance literature does provide a few clues as to why they are involved. In two influential 
papers, Peck and Tickell (1995; Peck, 1995) reason that the contemporary political 
empowerment of the private sector is the result of centrally-orchestrated, neoliberal state 
restructuring whereby state power is strategically licensed out to the private sector. Behind 
this restructuring is the belief that business elites possess more appropriate, neo-liberal-like 
skills for the job (e.g. creativity, market expertise, efficiency) than the ‘rule-bound’ public 
bureaucrats of local government (Peck, 1995; see also Farnsworth, 2006). Peck and Tickell, 
therefore, argue that business involvement should be seen as being ‘‘part and parcel of the 
process of state restructuring, not as some autonomous, grassroots revival of business 
paternalism” (Peck and Tickell, 1995, p. 76). Yet as Wood (2004, p. 2108) argues, their ‘state-
centric approach’ cannot answer one fundamental question: ‘‘why, in the absence of 
compulsion, do businessmen and women answer the ‘call to arms’?” 
Stone (1989) provides an indirect answer to this question. He argues that public and private 
institutions try to work together because of the deep-seated division of labour between the 
state and market in a fragmented, complex world. For Stone, no one group monopolises 
power and resources; therefore, policymakers and other elites actively seek to work with 
each other in order to fully realise their ambitions. However, this reasoning alone cannot 
explain the sharp rise in partnership working in the UK since the late 1980s. 
According to Logan and Molotch (1987; Molotch, 1976, 1993) and Cox and Mair (1988, 
1989), the thirst for profit maximisation is behind the political mobilisation of the private 
sector. For these authors, particular types of capital lead these partnerships, or ‘growth 
machines’ as Molotch (1976) calls them. Logan and Molotch pinpoint ‘rentiers’ (property 
owners) as the leaders of the growth machine. They argue that rentiers are ‘parochial capital’, 
whose assets are often geographically immobile or deep-rooted (e.g. buildings, land). As a 
result of this immobility, they either develop policies or lobby for policies that focus on 
intensifying or replacing existing land uses and attracting more mobile ‘metropolitan’ capital, 
in turn increasing land rent and property values. Similarly, Cox and Mair (1988, 1989) argue 
it is the extent of an institution’s local dependence – in other words, its relatively spatial 
immobility – that determines whether it will get involved in local economic development-
based coalitions or not (see also Imrie et al., 1995). As Cox and Mair (1988, p. 310) contend: 
‘‘[T]he primary interest of locally dependent firms is in defending or enhancing the 
flow of value through a specific locality: the territory that defines for them a 
geographically circumscribed content of exchange relations critical to their 
reproduction; and that, for reasons ranging from the immobility of their built 
environment facilities to the non-substitutable character of their exchange relations, is 
difficult to reconstitute elsewhere. Locally dependent firms [therefore] engage in 
collective strategies via business coalitions in order to realize their common interests in 
a particular area, interests that are antagonistic to those of locally dependent firms in 
other places.” 
Unlike Logan and Molotch, Cox and Mair do not suggest that property owners are the 
leaders in such a movement but do hint at their involvement alongside other locally 
dependent businesses such as financial institutions, public utilities and the local media. 
Logan and Molotch (1987) also argue that property owners are supported by other business 
interests who may benefit directly from real estate (e.g. construction, planning industries) or 
from increased consumption as a result of the redevelopment (e.g. retailers and the local 
media) (cf. Thomas, 1994). These observations reflect Peck’s (1995) wider insight that 
certain fractions of capital are more involved in, and encouraged to be involved in, urban 
governance than others. 
Wood and colleagues (Wood et al., 1998; Wood, 2004), however, are unconvinced that 
material interests easily translate into local political activity in the way that Cox and Mair 
imply. In a study of local business political mobilisation in Barnsley, Accrington and 
Macclesfield, they reason that ‘‘the creation of local business agendas may be simply one 
among a number of avenues through which businesses seek to realise their interests in the 
locality” (Wood et al., 1998, p. 22). They also point out that ‘locally dependent’ businesses 
may not always have common, complementary or coherent interests and agendas (see also 
Peck, 1995; Raco, 2003b). More crucially, they argue that local dependence alone does not 
explain private sector mobilisation and involvement. Rather as Wood (2004, p. 2112, 
emphasis in original) reveals: ‘‘the ties between firm characteristics and the extent and nature 
of their political activity [are] complex and variable. For the most part, the motivations 
driving engagement [are] not readily reducible to any simple set of commercial dependencies 
on the locality.” 
Wood and colleagues (Wood et al., 1998; Valler et al., 2000; North et al., 2001; Wood, 2004) 
also criticise the inattention to business agendas and agency within the ‘state-centric’ 
understandings of urban governance which focus on the creation of ‘institutional space’ for 
the private sector and the extra-local pressures on local PPPs. A more productive avenue of 
research, they argue, is to analyse the formative actions of business elites, business 
organisations and business agendas. For them, attention should be placed on three aspects: 
‘‘local business interest[s] and business organisations; the process of ‘business interest’ 
formation; and the subsequent deployment of business agendas by organisations both 
independently and within wider institutional fora” (Wood et al., 1998, p. 17). However, while 
their empirical analyses provide useful insights into the creation of business agendas, it fails 
to show the processes through which business agendas actually enter into public policy 
arenas. Perhaps unwittingly, business agenda formation and public policy formation appear 
as very separate spheres. 
On reflection then, some important insights have been made into the inclusion of the private 
sector within the ‘new urban politics’ (Cox, 1993). However, there remains little consensus as 
to why they get involved or what they actually do within urban governance. In order to 
understand these issues better, we need to take seriously the structuration of urban 
governance, highlighting the interconnectedness of structure and agency, business and state. 
No longer should we excessively privilege one side of these dualisms, leaving the other side 
neglected (Giddens, 1984; Valler and Wood, 2004; Gregson, 2005). Urban governance, after 
all, is shaped by ‘‘the interaction of a strategically selective context that privileges certain 
forms of interests and activities, and strategic actors who continually examine the options 
open to them in pursuing their various interests” (Valler and Wood, 2004, p. 1837, emphasis 
added). In concrete terms then, analyses of urban governance should pay particular attention 
to the relationship between (a) the selective opening up and monitoring of institutional space 
by the state and other institutions and (b) the agendas, ‘constrained agency’ and motivations 
of the business elites. Using this conceptual framework, this paper will now look at the 
positioning of the private sector within three Town Centre Management (TCM) partnerships 
in Coventry, Plymouth and Reading and their motivations for taking part. 
 
3. The introduction of Town Centre Management and Business Improvement 
District partnerships 
Since the mid-1990s, there has been a significant growth in the number of PPPs governing 
urban centres in England. The most prominent of these are TCM schemes and BIDs. TCM 
schemes and BIDs share similar characteristics and genealogies. Both are partnership-based 
and focused on creating conducive conditions for business profitability (Ward, 2007b). They 
seek to encourage more visitors, more investors and more sales, while fending off the 
increasing competition from elsewhere (e.g. out-of-town shopping centres, rival urban 
centres, business parks, retail parks). Both partnership-types attempt this by improving the 
public realm of their centres, often through mundane, routine services such as street 
cleaning, horticultural enhancements, CCTV monitoring and mobile security patrols 
(Mitchell, 2008; Cook, 2010). Many also seek to liaise with potential investors directly or 
attract them through promotional materials such as websites and newspaper advertisements 
(Warnaby et al., 2005). 
Neither BIDs nor TCM schemes are unique to England. TCM-like schemes are increasingly 
common in Australia and several European countries including France, Italy, Sweden and 
Spain (Forsberg et al., 1999; Coca-Stefaniak et al., 2009). BIDs, meanwhile, first emerged in 
North America and spread into New Zealand and South Africa and pockets of Western and 
Central Europe, notably Albania, Germany, Ireland, Serbia and the UK (Cook, 2008; Morçöl 
et al., 2008). The development of TCM in England, beginning in the late 1980s, was 
somewhat independent of the emergence of TCM-like schemes outside of the UK. In 
contrast, the introduction of BIDs in England during the early-to-mid 2000s drew on 
experiences elsewhere through a selective policy transfer from the United States where the 
New Labour government and Association of Town Centre Management perceived BIDs to 
be key players in the regeneration of once-depressed downtowns (Cook, 2008).1 
There are five other important differences between BIDs and TCM schemes. First, although 
both partnership-types receive mixed levels of public sector funding, the two have diverging 
private sector funding arrangements. English BIDs are funded primarily by a mandatory, 
multi-year tax on business occupiers, while TCM schemes receive only voluntary payments 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For critical overviews of the experience of BIDs in the US see Briffault (1999) and Mitchell (2008). 
from the private sector. The difference is important, not least because BIDs were introduced 
to help rectify the inadequate levels of private sector TCM funding (low levels of private 
sector donations were seen to be the result of the voluntary nature of private sector funding 
that allowed many businesses to ‘free-ride’ on others’ donations). Second, rather than being 
replacements of TCM, BIDs are frequently extensions to TCM schemes, often existing as 
sub-committees of TCM companies. Third, although a number of stand-alone BIDs are 
emerging, very few are in urban centres and the majority of these are in out-of-centre 
industrial estates and business parks – places that TCM has not emerged. Fourth, reflecting 
in part the much earlier introduction of TCM schemes, there are, at the time of writing, 
considerably more TCM schemes than BIDs in operation in England, with 81 BIDs and 
over 500 TCM schemes in November 2008 (www.atcm.org; www.ukbids.org).2 Fifth, 
business occupiers are allowed to vote on whether or not BIDs can be established in their 
district, an opportunity not available to businesses if a TCM scheme is planned in their 
district. 
Between 1987 and 1996, TCM emerged in the urban centres of Coventry, Plymouth and 
Reading amid uncertain economic conditions. Beginning in the 1970s deindustrialisation was 
destructively underway in Plymouth, Reading and, perhaps most painfully, Coventry where 
jobs in manufacturing were being, and continue to be, lost at a staggering rate in a once 
thriving city which promoted itself as the car manufacturing centre of the UK (see, for 
instance, Healey and Dunham, 1994). In addition to deindustrialisation, Plymouth was 
contending with a rapidly contracting dockyard that it depended upon for local employment 
(Bishop, 1991). In contrast to Plymouth and Coventry, Reading’s economy was able to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 TCM schemes and BIDs have also developed in other parts of the UK. However, BIDs only went ‘live’ in 
Scotland in 2008 (following the development of BIDs legislation and regulations by the Scottish Executive) 
and, at the time of writing, BIDs have yet to be legislated in Northern Ireland. 
mitigate the economic problems of its declining manufacturing sector primarily through the 
influx of new information technology, insurance and financial firms to the town (Raco, 
2004). Reading’s growing professional sector, however, could not mask the problems of its 
town centre which, like city centres of Coventry and Plymouth, was suffering from 
fluctuating levels of consumer spending and increased competition from new business parks, 
retail parks and rival centres. The controlling elites within the three councils felt that in order 
to bring economic regeneration, ‘‘feeding the downtown monster”, in the words of Harvey 
(2000, p. 141), was required. But they felt increasingly unable to do so by themselves. 
Establishing TCM, it was felt, would enable business elites to help them achieve this. After 
all, the private sector operated day-in, day-out in the centres, and better knew the needs of 
business and the ways to attract customers and investment. Developing TCM also meant 
that several sought-after central government regeneration grants, which were only available 
to PPPs, became accessible. The rolling out of TCM was also structured by the wider 
embrace, nationally and locally, of neoliberal ideologies which made speculative and 
partnership-based schemes such as TCM politically desirable (Lloyd and Peel, 2008). TCM 
was in the spirit of the times. 
The three TCM schemes have all evolved, acquiring new services, new private sector-led 
management boards and company status. By early 2005, CV One was responsible for a 
variety of ‘street services’ including car park management, CCTV monitoring, street trading 
licensing, street lighting maintenance, street cleaning, landscaping and the maintenance of 
the city centre public spaces. Following a merger with Coventry and Warwickshire 
Promotions, it also had responsibility for events management as well as promoting Coventry 
and the wider county of Warwickshire as a tourist destination. Plymouth CCC in early 2005 
was also responsible for encouraging inward investment, street trading licensing and city 
centre street wardens. Reading UK CIC, meanwhile, was responsible for strategic planning 
and attracting inward investment but did not deliver any ‘on-the-ground’ street services. 
Many of these services in the three partnerships were simply transferred from their 
respective councils (while continuing to be paid for by the councils), although a small 
number of services have been started up by the companies, often funded by non-council 
grants. 
  
Table 1. Partnership structures, operations and funding. 
 
Source: Partnership websites, interviews conducted and personal communication 
 
 CV One Plymouth CCC Reading UK CIC 
Establishment 
of TCM and 
BID 
Appointment of City Centre 
Janitor in 1987. TCM 
company formed in 1997. 
Merged with Coventry and 
Warwickshire Promotions in 
2002. BID established in 
2005 
Informal TCM board 
established in 1996. City 
Centre Manager appointed 
in 1998. BID established in 
2005 
Town Centre Manager 
appointed 1989. TCM board 
established in mid-1990s. 
BID established in 2006. 
Evolution into town-wide 
economic development 
company in 2007 
 
Legal status Not-for-profit company 
limited-by-guarantee (from 
1997) 
Not-for-profit company 
limited-by-guarantee (from 
2004) 
Community Interest 
Company (CIC) (from 2006) 
Relationship 
between TCM 
and BID tables 
BID committee reports to 
TCM board 
One board focusing on all 
TCM and BID issues 
BID committee reports to 
CIC board. The Reading 
Market Group, Local 
Economy Group and Staff 
Committee also report to 
CIC board 
Major TCM 
operations 
Car park management, street 
cleansing, landscaping, toilet 
cleaning, street trading 
licensing, retail radio and 
PubWatch, events 
management, marketing, 
CCTV monitoring, business 
development, Customer 
Service Assistants 
CCTV monitoring, street 
cleaning, street trading 
licensing, events 
management, marketing 
Strategic planning, 
marketing, inward 
investment and business 
support 
Major BID 
operations 
Evening Ambassadors, 
rapid response cleaning 
team, landscaping, 
Christmas lights, marketing 
Free membership to 
Plymouth Against Retail 
Crime (PARC) initiative, 
landscaping, cleaning, 
Christmas lights, signage 
and CCTV installation,  
PCSO match-funding 
Street washing, graffiti 
removal, Christmas lighting, 
marketing, PCSO match-
funding 
2007/08 
funding 
Approx. £9.7m including 
£6.3m grant from City 
Council and £286,000 from 
BID levy 
Approx. £660,000 including 
£256,000 from BID levy, 
£292,000 from City Council 
and £105,000 from property 
owners 
Approx. £550,000 including 
£275,000 from BID levy 
and £42,000 from Borough 
Council 
BID assessment 
formula 
0.9 percent of rateable value 
with 33 percent discount for 
businesses within shopping 
centres 
1 percent of rateable value 1 percent of rateable value 
excluding shopping centre 
businesses that do not have 
street-facing shop front 
Each of the three TCM schemes developed BIDs and these were introduced in April 2005 
(CV One, Plymouth CCC) and April 2006 (Reading UK CIC). As detailed in Table 1, 
additional services have been financed and governed by the BIDs, such as street cleaning, 
mobile patrols and Christmas lights by CV One and Plymouth CCC. The BID levy, 
furthermore, has allowed Reading UK CIC to provide on-the-ground street services for the 
first time. However, their BID services has been limited to the provision of twice-yearly 
power washing of the streets, the match-funding of Police Community Support Officers 
(PCSOs), graffiti removal, Christmas lights provision, additional marketing and CCTV 
signage. TCM services continue to be provided alongside the newer BID services. 
Furthermore, all three companies have added to their non-BID funded service portfolios 
since the rolling out of BIDs, adding services such as street cleaning and city-wide CCTV 
monitoring (Plymouth CCC) and city-wide economic development and tourism services 
(Reading UK CIC). 
 
4. Positioning business and business elites within BIDs and TCM 
Since their inceptions, officials and supporters have frequently cited the partnerships’ 
abilities to successfully and rightfully empower the private sector. For instance, one Reading 
UK CIC official interviewed (#2, July 2006) claimed that: ‘‘the fundamental principle is that 
the BID in Reading is 100% business-led”. Relatedly, it is frequently suggested that BIDs 
and TCM are simultaneously by business and for business. Going beyond the discourse, it is 
possible to identify 10 core, yet overlapping, positions that businesses and business elites 
have taken up, not always voluntarily, inside and outside of the partnerships. As Table 2 
demonstrates, these positions can be divided into three heuristic categories: internal 
facilitators (creators, governors, service providers), external facilitators (voters, funders, 
lobbyists, consultees) and recipients (service users, representees and beneficiaries). Many of 
these positions are not new to businesses in England who have been ‘courted’ by other 
partnership bodies since the early 1980s. However, the positioning of external businesses as 
voters is unique to BIDs, as is the positioning of businesses as mandatory funders. As TCM 
and BIDs have drawn upon old partnership-business relations and developed new relations, 
this paper will now focus in depth on one old relation (business as governors) and one new 
relation (business as voters). By doing this, the paper can provide a more detailed insight into 
the different ways in which businesses and business elites are approached and positioned 
within urban governance and the reasons behind their involvement. 
 
Table 2. The multiple positions of business and business elites within BIDs and TCM.  
Internal facilitators External facilitators Recipients 
Creators. Businesses can directly 
help establish both partnership-
types (e.g. through financing and 
governing their introduction). 
Voters. Business occupiers are 
allowed to vote to establish or 
reject a BID in their district. 
Businesses cannot vote on 
proposed TCM schemes. 
Service users. A number of TCM 
and BID services are solely 
provided for businesses within 
their districts (e.g. retail radios, 
business forums).  
Governors. Businesses can sit on 
committees and boards within 
both partnership-types making 
decisions about what services are 
provided, by whom and how. 
 
Funders. Businesses can voluntarily 
fund both partnership-types. If a 
BID is voted in, business 
occupiers must pay a BID levy. 
Other business types (e.g. 
property owners) do not pay the 
levy. 
Representees. TCM schemes and 
BIDs often liaise with and lobby 
councils, funding bodies and 
other organisations to gain 
favourable decisions for 
businesses in their district. 
Service deliverers. By governing 
TCM and BIDs, business elites 
can indirectly provide services for 
business in their area. If services 
are contracted out, profit-making 
firms can deliver these. 
 
Lobbyists. Businesses can actively 
encourage both partnership-types 
to alter, introduce, reject or 
dismantle a policy or service. They 
can also request that TCM and 
BIDs represents them in other 
institutional decision-making 
settings.  
Beneficiaries. Businesses can 
benefit directly and indirectly 
from (a) the services provided to 
them, customers and investors, 
and (b) the representation 
offered by both partnership-
types. The benefits will not be 
guaranteed or evenly distributed. 
 Consultees. Businesses can be 
consulted on policies and services 
 
in BIDs and TCM (e.g. through 
business forums). Businesses are 
especially consulted over the 
content of BID business plans. 
 
4.1. Business as governors 
Across the three partnerships, there are eight decision-making tables (including boards of 
directors and representative committees which operate under the board of directors), all of 
whom have private sector representatives. Plymouth CCC has one board governing all TCM 
and BID activities while CV One has a board responsible for pre-existing TCM functions 
and a BID committee responsible for overseeing the BID services. Within Reading UK CIC, 
there are four committees (for marketing, economic development, the BID and staff 
matters) that are accountable to the board of directors. 
As Table 3 shows, the decision-making tables are made up of a mixture of partnership staff 
and representatives from the private and public sectors. All tables feature public sector 
officials with councils the most frequently represented institution. Nonetheless, the vast 
majority of members are from the private sector, almost all of these being representatives of 
companies that have physical assets (such as stores or property) within the associated 
districts. Retailers dominate some boards (e.g. the Reading UK CIC BID committee) but are 
less prevalent on others (e.g. CV One board of directors). Property owners are often well 
represented on most boards but absent on CV One’s BID committee and Reading UK 
CIC’s BID committee. With a few exceptions, independent businesses, industry and office-
based businesses are under-represented on the eight tables with ‘shop-floor’ workers and 
trade unions completely absent. Reflecting wider patterns in local governance structures (see 
Tickell and Peck, 1996; Robinson and Shaw, 2003), the tables are dominated by white, 
middle-aged, middle-class men; exceptions are rare. 
The table members across the three partnerships are responsible for making major ‘in-house’ 
decisions primarily through board and committee meetings. In Coventry and Reading, BID 
committee members are responsible for making delegated decisions regarding the delivery of 
the BID services. Day-to-day management of the partnerships is devolved to the manager 
and staff in the three partnerships, and they are accountable to the committee and board 
members. The committee members at CV One and Reading UK CIC are also accountable to 
board members. Apart from the day-to-day partnership staff on the boards and committees, 
the public and private representatives consider their positions to be part-time attending less 
than a handful of meetings a year. Compared to their ‘day jobs’, the hours spent in the 
capacities of partnership members are very limited. Reflecting the corporatisation of the 
three partnerships, the members’ roles have morphed over time moving away from advisors 
to their respective councils to making important decisions themselves. There is a degree of 
variation between the roles on the three boards, due to, among other things, the nature of 
the services provided, the mentalities and vested interests of the members, and the finances 
available. Nevertheless, the private sector members across the three partnerships and eight 
tables share three core responsibilities (cf. Harris, 1996; Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister, 2004, p. 21). 
  
